TWENTY YEARS FOR IPOB MEMBERSHIP: NIGERIA’S COURTS CANNOT TURN AN EX PARTE PROSCRIPTION ORDER INTO A LICENCE TO CRUSH BIAFRAN IDENTITY


PUBLIC LEGAL STATEMENT

By Christopher Chidera, Esq.

The sentencing of 48-year-old Paul Okechukwu to 20 years’ imprisonment by Justice Hauwa Yilwa of the Federal High Court in Abuja for alleged membership of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) has been described as a grotesque abuse of judicial power.

In this public legal statement, Christopher Chidera, Esq., characterises the development as a state-engineered campaign to criminalise political identity, bypass statutory rules of proof, and weaponise administrative labels to silence the Biafran self-determination movement.

The statement challenges the legal foundation of the conviction, raising questions about the validity of the proscription order against IPOB, the use of a repealed terrorism law, and the constitutional requirements for establishing criminal liability.

It poses a central question to the Abuja judiciary: When did an un-appealed, procedurally defective, ex parte administrative order replace the constitutional requirement to prove a specific crime under a valid written law?

1. YOU CANNOT ERASE JUSTICE NYAKO’S BINDING RULING

On March 2, 2017, Justice Binta Nyako struck out six counts against Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, ruling inter partes that IPOB was not an unlawful society.

According to Chidera, the state subsequently engaged in what he describes as blatant forum shopping by approaching Justice Abdul Abdu-Kafarati in a closed-door ex parte proceeding to obtain an administrative proscription order without notifying IPOB.

The statement argues that setting aside an inter partes judicial determination in favour of a one-sided administrative decree undermines justice and amounts to political subjugation.

2. AN EX PARTE ORDER IS NOT A CONSTITUTIONAL BLANK CHEQUE

Chidera cites Order 26, Rule 12 of the Federal High Court Rules, arguing that an ex parte order is a temporary emergency measure with a strict 14-day lifespan.

He contends that transforming a two-week interim procedural order into a permanent basis for a 20-year prison sentence violates fundamental principles of civil procedure and Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution.

The statement identifies two major concerns:

  • Status is not conduct: Proscription regulates an organisation’s administrative status; it does not, by itself, establish an individual’s criminal guilt.

  • No shortcuts on proof: An executive designation does not relieve the state of its obligation to prove an overt criminal act against the defendant.

3. KANU’S APPELLANT BRIEF GUTS COUNT THREE

The statement argues that Mazi Nnamdi Kanu’s 22-ground Appellant Brief undermines the legal foundation of the prosecutions.

Chidera identifies three key arguments:

1. Lack of Presidential Authority

The statement contends that the proscription order failed to satisfy basic statutory prerequisites. It cites Justice James Omotosho’s decision in MultiChoice Nigeria Ltd v. FCCPC as reinforcing the principle that statutory powers vested in a specific authority cannot be bypassed or assumed without explicit compliance with the applicable conditions precedent.

2. Ex Parte Cannot Defeat Inter Partes

Chidera argues that an administrative order obtained behind closed doors cannot override an existing, binding judicial determination.

3. Pending Apex Review

The statement maintains that rushing lower courts to impose maximum sentences while the Supreme Court is considering the legality of the proscription demonstrates, in Chidera’s view, a frantic effort to silence dissent before the legal foundation of the proscription collapses.

4. CONVICTING UNDER A DEAD LAW

Chidera alleges that Justice James Omotosho’s November 20, 2025 judgment against Nnamdi Kanu established a lawless precedent by convicting him under the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013, which the statement says was expressly repealed by the 2022 Act.

He further alleges that Justice Hauwa Yilwa repeated the same constitutional error when sentencing Paul Okechukwu to 20 years’ imprisonment under Section 16 of the 2013 Act.

The statement invokes Section 36(12) of the 1999 Constitution, which prohibits the conviction of a person for a criminal offence unless the offence is defined and its penalty prescribed in a written law.

It argues that although a general statutory savings clause may preserve pending proceedings and accrued liabilities, it does not resurrect a repealed penal statute as the operative legal basis for a conviction.

Chidera concludes that imposing two-decade prison sentences on the basis of an expired statute would constitute an outright nullity.

5. ASSOCIATION IS NOT TERRORISM

The statement asserts that prosecutors dropped the violent attack count against Paul Okechukwu and proceeded solely on the allegation of membership.

According to Chidera, this amounted to an admission that the prosecution had no evidence of violence.

He argues that imprisoning an individual for two decades based merely on association, without a proven act of violence, amounts to judicial violence.

The statement maintains that alleged membership of an organisation should not automatically substitute for proof of the specific criminal conduct required to sustain a conviction.

6. A DIRECT WARNING TO DETAINEES: DO NOT PLEAD GUILTY UNDER COERCION

Chidera addresses Igbo youths and Biafran activists allegedly held in Wawa Barracks and other secret detention facilities across Nigeria, warning them against pleading guilty to offences they did not commit because of psychological torture, starvation, isolation or other forms of coercion.

He alleges that the state’s strategy is to break detainees psychologically through indefinite and inhumane detention until a 20-year prison sentence appears preferable to continued confinement.

The statement warns: “A coerced plea is not freedom—it is a trap that legalises your torment and cements your imprisonment.”

Chidera outlines three recommendations for detainees:

  • Hold the line: Desperation does not validate a false confession, and psychological coercion, he argues, invalidates a guilty plea under Section 36 of the Constitution.

  • Demand legal access: Detainees are urged to refuse to sign pre-drafted admissions or accept plea bargains without independent, uncoerced legal counsel.

  • Force the state to prove its case: An executive designation is not proof of individual guilt. The statement urges defendants to require the prosecution to discharge its constitutional burden under a valid written law.

FIVE QUESTIONS THE BENCH CANNOT EVADE

The statement concludes by presenting five questions it says the judiciary must answer:

  1. How can the state rely on an ex parte order while ignoring Justice Nyako’s binding inter partes ruling that IPOB is lawful?

  2. By what constitutional logic does a 14-day interim order become a permanent presumption of criminal guilt?

  3. How can a conviction delivered under a repealed statute satisfy Section 36(12) of the Constitution?

  4. Where is the written law converting peaceful advocacy or Biafran identity into a 20-year terrorist offence?

  5. What specific, overt act of violence did Paul Okechukwu commit to justify stealing 20 years of his life?

Chidera maintains that judicial authority must remain subject to constitutional limits, arguing that a judge’s position does not place him above the Constitution and that labelling a movement “terrorist” does not suspend fundamental human rights.

The statement concludes with a call for constitutional supremacy and the rule of law over political intimidation.

“The Constitution remains supreme. The law must prevail over political intimidation.”

Christopher Chidera, Esq.
Legal Practitioner & Public Interest Analyst

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